There were two major weaknesses faced by our army that would have a significant impact in the 1965 war, particularly in the offensive at Khem Karan. The artillery had done even better, with a fivefold increase from eight regiments at Independence to a staggering 41 by 1959.ĭivision commanders were hard pressed to find troops to defend their large frontages and though the army had devised a New Concept of Defense to address this, there were strong reservations on its viability and it did not survive the first shots of the 1965 war The Pakistani regiments were grouped into one heavy and one light armoured division and there were a number of regiments of Shermans supporting the infantry divisions. In comparison, the Indians had 16 regiments, of which only 4 were equipped with British Centurion tanks that could match the M-47/48s and the rest were mainly WW2-era Shermans. With this equipment, the armoured corps tripled in size to 18 regiments, of which 10 were equipped with Pattons. However, what gave us a big lead over the Indians in quality and quantity were 500 M-47/48 Pattons and 110 M-24 light reconnaissance tanks that were supplied through a US Military Assistance Program (MAP) during the 1950s and into the early 1960s.

In 1952, when the Americans allowed us to purchase 352 up-gunned and refurbished Shermans and 75 M-36 Tank Destroyers at seven percent of their value, the Pakistan Armoured Corps became an all-tracked force.

The rest had light tanks and armoured cars. Within our share of six armoured regiments, only three were equipped with Sherman tanks of Second World War vintage. The shortage of experienced officers was particularly pronounced in the armoured corps and until well past the 1965 war, the premier armoured formations of the Pakistan Army were mainly commanded by officers from the infantry – only a few of whom had any idea of the training and employment of armour. 50 anti-aircraft machineguns at the ready, Khem Karan Sector Consequently, in 1965, Indian commanders at the division level and above had some 8-9 years more service and experience than their counterparts in Pakistan.

Iftikhar Khan, who was being groomed as the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), was promoted from a lieutenant colonel to major general within two years after Independence. Moreover, compared to the Indians, our leadership was inexperienced. All of this went to independent India’s armed forces. To support the Burma Theatre during the Second World War, the British had established the bulk of their training bases and logistical infrastructure in areas that formed part of post-Independence India. In order for the reader to understand why the first succeeded and the second failed, I neeed to take us back in time to how the Pakistan Army grew after Independence and how its operational thinking developed.Ĭompared to India, the army that Pakistan inherited at Independence was badly fractured and poorly equipped. Anthony (Tony) Lumb commanded the 4th Armoured Brigade at Khem Karan, 1965īoth battles were fought very differently by the two adversaries. On the other hand, the success of the defensive battle at Chawinda was largely a result of the resilience of commanders and the determination of tank crews, as well as the excellent support provided by the artillery and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The failure of the counteroffensive launched from the area of Khem Karan was primarily due to the manner in which the armoured division was employed and the area selected for the offensive by the highest levels of command. Both are associated with tank battles fought by the Pakistan Army the first a failure but the second a great success. In our memory of the 1965 war, the names of two places standout – Asal Uttar/Khem Karan and Chawinda. (from History of the Indo-Pak War – 1965 by Lt. The bitter truth of the 1965 War is that 1 Armoured Division was never fully employed either at Khem Karan or at Sialkot.” “One of the greatest ironies of the 1965 War is the unjust criticism heaped on 1 Armoured Division after the War.

Famous tank battles